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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.   
H.K. was a student at Hatikvah International Academy 
Charter School (“Hatikvah”), a public charter school located in 
East Brunswick, New Jersey.  After H.K.’s parents unilaterally 
moved H.K. from Hatikvah to a private school, Hatikvah and 
H.K.’s parents agreed on an individualized education program 
(“IEP”) that kept H.K. at the private school.  The East 
Brunswick Township Board of Education (“East Brunswick”), 
H.K.’s resident school district, challenged this IEP in state 
administrative proceedings.  
 
The parties dispute whether the financial responsibility 
for a student’s pendent placement costs rests with the resident 
school district or the student’s former charter school under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11, when the student’s former charter 
school implemented the IEP that placed the student at a private 
school.  The District Court concluded that financial 
responsibility for H.K.’s tuition costs rested with Hatikvah but 
ordered East Brunswick to pay for his transportation costs.  We 
hold that financial responsibility for all pendent placement 
costs rests entirely with the resident school district.  We 




H.K. is a fifth grader who has been diagnosed with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional 
tendencies, and developmental delays.  He lives with his 
parents within East Brunswick’s geographic boundaries.  H.K. 
was previously enrolled at Hatikvah, a local educational 
agency.  See 34 C.F.R. § 300.28(a) (defining a “[l]ocal 
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educational agency” as a “public authority legally constituted 
within a State” to direct or serve public schools).  Although 
both East Brunswick and Hatikvah are funded by taxpayers, 
East Brunswick’s annual budget is approximately twenty-five 
times greater than Hatikvah’s budget.  
  
In September 2018, Hatikvah proposed an IEP under 
which H.K. would attend the Bridge Academy School, a 
private school.  H.K.’s parents instead unilaterally enrolled 
H.K. in a different private school, the Laurel School of 
Princeton (the “Laurel School”).  H.K.’s parents subsequently 
filed a due process petition under the IDEA against Hatikvah 
and East Brunswick, seeking reimbursement for H.K.’s costs 
of attendance at the Laurel School.  East Brunswick did not 
object at the time to H.K.’s placement at the Laurel School.   
 
Hatikvah and H.K.’s parents settled on the record before 
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and Hatikvah agreed, 
inter alia, to implement a new IEP that kept H.K. at the Laurel 
School.  East Brunswick did not participate in the proceedings 
and was not party to the agreement.  Counsel for East 
Brunswick, however, was present when the settlement 
agreement was placed on the record.  The ALJ approved the 
settlement.  East Brunswick subsequently filed a separate due 
process petition with the New Jersey Department of 
Education’s Office of Special Education Programs in which it 
challenged H.K.’s placement at the Laurel School and argued 
that East Brunswick could provide H.K. with a free, 
appropriate public education in a less restrictive environment.  
The ALJ concluded in June 2021 that East Brunswick failed to 
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show that it could provide H.K. with the education provided 
for in his IEP.1  
 
In response to East Brunswick’s due process petition, 
H.K.’s parents filed an emergency motion to compel East 
Brunswick to pay for H.K.’s costs of attending the Laurel 
School while East Brunswick’s due process petition was 
litigated.  Hatikvah supported the motion.  The parties agreed 
that H.K. should remain at the Laurel School while East 
Brunswick’s petition was pending, meaning that the parties 
agreed that the Laurel School is H.K.’s pendent placement for 
purposes of the IDEA.  They dispute only whether Hatikvah or 
East Brunswick should bear the cost of H.K.’s pendent 
placement.  The ALJ concluded that East Brunswick would 
transport H.K. to and from the Laurel School but that Hatikvah 
would be responsible for both tuition and transportation costs.   
 
Hatikvah sought an automatic injunction under the 
IDEA and a preliminary injunction from the District Court and 
asked the court to vacate the ALJ’s order to the extent that it 
required Hatikvah to pay for H.K.’s costs.  The District Court 
granted in part Hatikvah’s motion and vacated the portion of 
the ALJ’s order requiring Hatikvah to reimburse East 
 
1  The ALJ ordered East Brunswick to reimburse Hatikvah 
for H.K.’s costs from the date of his IEP — October 28, 2019.  
H.K. has attended the Laurel School, however, since 
September 2018.  Because the ALJ’s order did not address 
reimbursements for the 2018–19 school year and because 
Hatikvah has represented that it will appeal the ALJ’s decision, 
absent relief from this Court, we conclude that this case is not 
moot.  See United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Gov’t of V.I., 
842 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2016).  
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Brunswick for its transportation costs.  East Brunswick does 
not appeal from this decision.  The court otherwise denied 
Hatikvah’s motion, so Hatikvah is currently required to pay for 
the tuition costs of H.K.’s pendent placement.  Hatikvah timely 
appealed to challenge the District Court’s decision with respect 
to tuition.  H.K.’s parents support Hatikvah’s position in these 




We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
1292(a)(1).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We review de novo 
the application of the stay-put rule to a given set of facts.  D.M. 




Hatikvah contends that East Brunswick is responsible 
for H.K.’s pendent placement costs under the IDEA’s stay-put 
rule and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11.  We agree.  The stay-
put rule requires that, “during the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local 
educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child 
shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the 
child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  This rule is protective in nature 
and reflects Congress’s policy choice that all children with 
disabilities remain in their current educational placement until 
the dispute about their placement is resolved, “regardless of 
whether their case is meritorious or not.”  Susquenita Sch. Dist. 
v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Drinker v. 
Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864–65 (3d Cir. 1996)).  The 
stay-put rule consequently functions as an “automatic 
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preliminary injunction,” and the “usual prerequisites to 
injunctive relief are not required.”  D.M., 801 F.3d at 211 
(quoting Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
The primary factor in determining a child’s current 
educational placement is the IEP that was “actually 
functioning” when the stay-put rule was invoked.  Raelee S., 
96 F.3d at 83 (quoting Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867).  The stay-put 
rule does not immediately take effect if the parents 
“unilaterally move their child from an IEP-specified program 
to their desired alternative setting.”  M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 
744 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2014).  The rule protects the new 
placement, however, “if the parents and the State or local 
educational agency agree to the change.”  Id. at 118–19 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
We have previously explained in disputes between 
parents and school districts that the financial responsibility for 
a student’s pendent placement costs lies with the resident 
school district.  See, e.g., id.; Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84.  The 
IDEA itself does not specify which party must pay for the 
student’s stay-put costs.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  But it is 
“well established” that the resident school district must fund a 
student’s private placement if it is the educational setting the 
student’s current IEP prescribes.  M.R., 744 F.3d at 119.  This 
financial obligation “arises automatically” when the private 
school is the student’s pendent placement.  See id. at 123 
(“[T]he obligation arises automatically from a determination 
that the private school is the protected status quo during the 
period in which the dispute resolution process is ongoing.”).  
Consequently, “financing goes hand-in-hand with pendent 
private-school placement.”  Id.  A party therefore does not need 
to request separately reimbursement for the student’s stay-put 
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costs.  See id. (rejecting the school district’s argument that “the 
IDEA does not automatically provide for reimbursement”); see 
also Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84 (“[W]e conclude that a school 
district may be required to pay for tuition and expenses 
associated with a pendent placement prior to the conclusion of 
litigation.”).  Although our prior cases interpreting the IDEA 
have not addressed disputes involving charter schools, we see 
no reason why their reasoning and interpretation of the IDEA 
should not extend to this case to require East Brunswick to pay 
for H.K.’s pendent placement costs.  See, e.g., M.R., 744 F.3d 
at 119; Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84.  
 
To the extent the IDEA and our case law are not 
dispositive of cost allocation in this situation, New Jersey law 
is.  New Jersey law explicitly extends the resident school 
district’s financial obligations to costs associated with an IEP 
that a charter school implements.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-
11 broadly requires charter schools that provide services to 
students with disabilities to comply with state laws.  But it also 
explicitly provides that “the fiscal responsibility for any 
student currently enrolled in or determined to require a private 
day or residential school shall remain with the district of 
residence,” not with the charter school.  Id. § 18A:36A-11(b).  
The statute, however, does allow the resident school district to 
challenge the student’s placement within thirty days of 
receiving notice of the IEP.  Id.  Although the statute does not 
specifically refer to pendent placement costs, it can be read in 
harmony with the IDEA to require that a resident school 
district that challenges a student’s private placement must still 
fund the student’s pendent placement costs, even in cases 
where the charter school created and implemented the 
student’s IEP.  Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84; see N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18A:36A-11(b); see also Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 
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Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994) (“[C]ourts should 
construe statutes .  .  .  to foster harmony with other statutory 
and constitutional law.”).  
 
In this case, H.K.’s parents unilaterally moved him to 
the Laurel School.  H.K.’s parents, however, and Hatikvah, the 
local educational agency, subsequently agreed to a new IEP 
that kept H.K. at the Laurel School.  Because Hatikvah agreed 
to the IEP that prescribes the Laurel School as H.K.’s 
educational setting and because H.K. was already a student at 
the Laurel School when the stay-put rule was invoked — points 
that the parties do not dispute — the stay-put rule protects 
H.K.’s pendent placement at the Laurel School.  East 
Brunswick therefore must fund H.K.’s pendent placement at 
the Laurel School, including tuition and transportation costs.  
See M.R., 744 F.3d at 119.  Hatikvah’s status as a public 
charter school does not change East Brunswick’s financial 
responsibilities.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11(b).  
 
East Brunswick argues that Hatikvah is not entitled to 
relief under the stay-put rule because its claim concerns only 
monetary damages, not H.K.’s stay-put placement.  But we 
have made clear that “financing goes hand-in-hand with 
pendent private-school placement.”  M.R., 744 F.3d at 123.  
East Brunswick’s financial responsibility began under the stay-
put rule once there was an agreement with respect to H.K.’s 
pendent placement.  See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84.  The IDEA 
does not require Hatikvah to request separately reimbursement 
for H.K.’s pendent placement costs.  See M.R., 744 F.3d at 
123; Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84–85.  Hatikvah is thus entitled to 




Our conclusion also does not render illusory East 
Brunswick’s right to object to H.K.’s placement.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 18A:36A-11(b) gives resident districts the right to 
challenge a student’s placement within thirty days — a right 
that East Brunswick has already exercised.  Requiring East 
Brunswick to fulfill its financial obligations does not interfere 
with this right.  The resident school district’s responsibility to 
pay for the student’s stay-put costs while challenging the 
student’s placement “remain[s] intact” until the final resolution 
of the dispute, regardless of whether the school district’s “case 
is meritorious or not.”  See M.R., 744 F.3d at 125 (quoting 
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864) (emphasis omitted); see also Drinker, 
78 F.3d at 865 (“[I]mplicit in the maintenance of the status quo 
is the requirement that a school district continue to finance an 
educational placement made by the agency and consented to 
by the parent before the parent requested a due process 
hearing.” (quoting Zvi D. ex rel. Shirley D. v. Ambach, 694 
F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982)) (alteration in original)).  New 
Jersey law similarly imposes this requirement on resident 
school districts and does not exempt resident school districts 
from this financial responsibility when they challenge the 
student’s placement.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11(b).  
East Brunswick is therefore permitted to object to H.K.’s 
placement, but it nonetheless must fund his pendent placement 
costs.2 
 
2  East Brunswick relies on our non-precedential opinion 
in L.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Bayonne Board of Education, 384 F. 
App’x 58 (3d Cir. 2010).  East Brunswick’s reliance on L.Y. is 
misguided.  The Court in L.Y. was not only faced with 
distinguishable and non-analogous facts, but also the Court 
explicitly recognized that the school district “bears fiscal 
responsibility for a child’s special education services when the 
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We recognize that our conclusion today may raise 
concerns that a public charter school unnecessarily will send 
students to a private school to shift fiscal responsibility to the 
resident school district.  But reaching the opposite result and 
requiring charter schools — whose budgets are frequently 
much smaller than those of school districts — to bear the 
financial burden in turn could lead to charter schools refraining 
from placing students in private schools, thus depriving 
students that require private placement of an appropriate 
education.  See M.R., 744 F.3d at 126 (discussing how stay-
put protection is necessary to prevent parents from facing “the 
untenable choice” of removing their child from the child’s 
private pendent placement or bearing the costs of this 
placement themselves); Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 87 (discussing 
how the IDEA requires that school districts bear the financial 
burden).  New Jersey has explicitly rejected this alternative in 
favor of requiring resident school districts to bear the financial 
burden.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11(b).  In other words, 
New Jersey’s decision to give charter schools the authority to 
implement IEPs while leaving financial responsibility with the 
resident school district means that any tension stemming from 
the separation of financial responsibility and decision-making 
authority is an apparently deliberate policy choice.  See id.  Just 
as “Congress has imposed a significant financial burden on 
States and school districts that participate in [the] IDEA,” 
Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993), 
New Jersey too has placed this burden on resident school 
districts.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11(b).  Although “we 
are mindful of the financial burden which will, in some 
 
IEP requires placement at a private school.”  Id. at 61.  
Moreover, our non-precedential opinions are not binding, and 
we do not rely on them as authority.  3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7. 
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instances, be borne by local school districts,” Raelee S., 96 
F.3d at 87, our IDEA case law and the language of N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 18A:36A-11(b) require that the resident school district 
pay for the student’s pendent placement costs, even if the 
student’s former charter school created and implemented the 




Because we conclude that East Brunswick bears the 
burden of H.K.’s pendent placement costs under the stay-put 
rule, we will reverse the District Court’s Order with respect to 
H.K.’s tuition costs and remand for further proceedings.4   
 
3  Our recent decision in Y.B. v. Howell Township Board 
of Education, 4 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2021), does not alter our 
conclusion, given that the stay-put provision did not apply in 
Y.B., whereas it does in this case.  Id. at 201. 
4  Because we conclude that Hatikvah is entitled to an 
automatic injunction, we do not reach whether Hatikvah is 
entitled to a “traditional” preliminary injunction.  
